بَابُ الْأَيْمَانِ وَالنُّذُوْرِOaths and Vows

¹ The statement: “He swore: No, by the One who turns the hearts” indicates that swearing by Allah, the Exalted, or by one of His names, even if it is a shared name that has become customary to swear by, is permissible according to the school of thought. This includes names like the Most Merciful, the Compassionate, the Forbearing, the All-Knowing, the Master of the Day of Judgment, the Pursuer, the Victor, and the Truth, whether definite or indefinite. In “Al-Mujtaba,” it is stated: If one intends by shared names something other than an oath, such as a religion or an attribute customarily sworn by among His attributes, the Exalted, whether an attribute of essence that has no opposite, like the might of Allah, His majesty, grandeur, dominion, power, greatness, or ability, or an attribute of action that can have an opposite, like anger or pleasure, then oaths are based on custom. What is customarily sworn by is an oath, and what is not is not an oath. One does not swear by an attribute not customarily sworn by among His attributes, the Exalted, such as His mercy, knowledge, pleasure, anger, wrath, punishment, curse, law, religion, limits, description, or “Glory be to Allah,” and the like, due to the absence of custom. This applies specifically to attributes, unlike names, where custom is not considered, as previously mentioned. This is taken from “Ad-Durr al-Mukhtar” and “Radd al-Muhtar.” In “Rahmat al-Ummah,” it is stated: They agreed that an oath by Allah is binding, and by all His beautiful names, such as the Most Merciful, the Compassionate, the Living, and by all attributes of His essence, such as the might of Allah and His majesty, except that Abu Hanifah excluded the knowledge of Allah, not considering it an oath. In “Al-Inayah,” it is stated: The name here refers to a word indicating the essence described by an attribute, such as the Most Merciful and the Compassionate, and the attribute refers to verbal nouns derived from describing Allah with names of His actions, such as mercy, knowledge, and might. In the commentary on “Al-Kanz” by Zayla’i and “Burhan Sharh Mawahib ar-Rahman,” it is stated: The scholars of Iraq mentioned that swearing by attributes of essence is an oath, but not by attributes of action. The scholars of Transoxiana stated that custom is considered, so any attribute customarily sworn by, whether an attribute of essence like ability or an attribute of action like creation and provision, is an oath. What is not customarily sworn by, whether an attribute of essence or action, is not an oath. This is the correct view. The conclusion is that swearing by Allah’s names is undoubtedly an oath, while swearing by His attributes depends on custom, and swearing by anything other than Allah is absolutely not an oath.

¹ The statement: “No, and I seek Allah’s forgiveness” in its apparent form is not an oath, but it resembles an oath in that it emphasizes speech. It can be said that the “and” is for swearing, and the object of the oath is omitted, meaning “No, by Allah,” then he began with the statement “I seek Allah’s forgiveness,” meaning if the matter is contrary to that. Or it could mean: “And I seek Allah’s forgiveness from swearing,” as it is preferable to avoid swearing except when necessary, for it is inherently risky and prohibited. Thus, some refrained from swearing even if truthful. What is established from him (ﷺ) was due to the need to emphasize a ruling or clarify permissibility. Hence, it is said: When he intended to swear, he mentioned this instead of swearing and did not swear. [Summarized from “Al-Mirqat”]

¹ The statement: “Allah forbids you from swearing by your forefathers, etc.”: Muhammad said in “Al-Muwatta”: This is what we follow; no one should swear by his father, and whoever swears should swear by Allah, then fulfill it or remain silent. In “Al-Mirqat,” it is stated: The prohibition refers to anything other than Allah, and forefathers were specified because it was the custom of the descendants. In “Al-Hidayah,” it is stated: Whoever swears by other than Allah is not considered to have sworn, such as by the Prophet or the Ka’bah, due to the statement: “Whoever among you swears, let him swear by Allah or leave it.” Similarly, if one swears by the Qur’an, as it is not customary. This indicates that it is not from the category of swearing by other than Allah, but from the category of attributes, hence it is justified by the lack of custom. If it were from the first category, the reason would be the mentioned prohibition or another, as custom is considered only in shared attributes, not in others. Al-Kamal said: It is evident that swearing by the Qur’an is now customary, so it is an oath. This is taken from “Ad-Durr al-Mukhtar” and “Radd al-Muhtar.” In “Nayl al-Awtar,” it is stated: The hadiths of this chapter indicate that swearing by other than Allah is not binding, as prohibition implies the invalidity of the prohibited act, and this is the view of the majority. Some Hanbalis said: Swearing by our Prophet (ﷺ) is binding, and expiation is required. This is also in “Radd al-Muhtar.”

² The statement: “Do not swear by idols, etc.”: The Arabs in their pre-Islamic ignorance used to swear by them and by their forefathers, so they were forbidden from this to remain vigilant in their speech, lest their tongues slip into what they were accustomed to. [From “Al-Mirqat”]

¹ The statement: “Whoever swears by trustworthiness”: Meaning absolutely, without attributing it to Allah, is not one of us, indicating prohibition because it is commanded to swear by Allah and His attributes, and trustworthiness is not one of His attributes but a matter of His affairs and an obligation of His obligations. They were forbidden from it due to equating it with Allah’s names and attributes, the Exalted. Perhaps it refers to a warning against it, as it is swearing by other than Allah, and no expiation is required by consensus. There is disagreement regarding saying “By the trustworthiness of Allah.” Shafi’i said: It is not an oath, and no expiation is required for breaking it. Abu Hanifah said: It is an oath, and expiation is required for breaking it. In “Al-Bada’i,” it is stated: There are differing narrations among us regarding the oath by saying “By the trustworthiness of Allah.” In “Al-Asl,” it is stated that it is an oath. Ibn Sama’ah narrated from Abu Yusuf that it is not an oath. Tahawi narrated from our companions that it is not an oath. The reasoning for Tahawi’s view is that the trustworthiness of Allah refers to the obligations He has imposed on His servants, such as prayer, fasting, and others, as Allah, the Exalted, said: Indeed, We offered the Trust to the heavens and the earth and the mountains, but they declined to bear it (Al-Ahzab: 72). Thus, it is swearing by other than Allah’s name, the Mighty, the Exalted, so it is not an oath. The reasoning for “Al-Asl” is that trustworthiness attributed to Allah, the Exalted, in the context of an oath refers to His attribute. Do you not see that the Trustworthy is one of Allah’s names, derived from trustworthiness? Thus, when used absolutely, especially in the context of an oath, it refers to Allah’s attribute. In “Radd al-Muhtar,” it is stated: In “Al-Khaniyah,” “The trustworthiness of Allah” is an oath. Tahawi stated it is not an oath, and this is a narration from Abu Yusuf. In “Al-Fath,” it is stated: According to us, Malik, and Ahmad, it is an oath. According to Shafi’i, it depends on intention, as it is interpreted as referring to acts of worship. We say: The prevailing intention in the context of an oath prevails, so it does not depend on intention due to the dominant custom. This establishes that the relied-upon view is that of “Al-Khaniyah.”

¹ The statement: “Whoever swears by a religion other than Islam, lying deliberately, is as he said”: “Other than Islam” is an attribute of “religion.” If he did such and such, he is a Jew, a Christian, or free from Islam. Is this type of speech called an oath in the custom of the Shariah? Is expiation required for breaking it? Nakha’i, Awza’i, Thawri, the companions of Abu Hanifah, Ahmad, and Ishaq held that it is an oath, and expiation is required for breaking it. Malik, Shafi’i, and Abu Ubayd said: It is not an oath, and there is no expiation, but the one who says it is sinful whether he is truthful or lying. They argued with the statement: “Whoever swears and says, ‘By al-Lat and al-Uzza,’ let him say, ‘There is no god but Allah,’” and no expiation is mentioned in the hadith. We say: The absence of mention does not necessitate the negation of expiation. Our evidence is this hadith mentioned in the book, as Allah, the Exalted, obligated expiation for one who makes a declaration of prohibition, which is an evil and false statement, and swearing by these things is evil and false. The author of “Al-Hidayah” said: We hold this by analogy to prohibiting the permissible, as it is an oath by the text, for he (ﷺ) prohibited Mariyah to himself, so Allah, the Exalted, revealed: O Prophet, why do you prohibit what Allah has made lawful for you? (At-Tahrim: 1), then said: Allah has ordained for you the dissolution of your oaths (At-Tahrim: 2). This is supported by what Allamah Muhammad Ahsan as-Siddiqi an-Nanotawi said in the margin of “Al-Kanz,” taken from its commentaries: Ibn Abbas said: Whoever swears by Judaism, it is an oath. It is also supported by what Bayhaqi narrated from Zayd ibn Thabit. Thus, it is stated in “Ad-Durr al-Mukhtar” and “Radd al-Muhtar”: Swearing by saying, “If I do such and such, I am a Jew, a Christian, bear witness that I am a Christian, a partner with the disbelievers, or a disbeliever,” requires expiation if he breaks it, by analogy to prohibiting the permissible. Since he made the condition a sign of disbelief, and he believed it obligatory to abstain, and it is possible to say it is obligatory for another reason, we consider it an oath. This applies to the future. As for the past, such as saying, “If I did such and such, I am a disbeliever or a Jew,” or the like, knowing it is contrary, it is a deliberate false oath with no expiation except repentance. There is disagreement regarding his disbelief. The correct view is that the one who swears does not become a disbeliever, whether it is about the past or the future, if he believes it is an oath. If he is ignorant and believes he becomes a disbeliever in a deliberate false oath or by fulfilling the condition in the future, he becomes a disbeliever in both cases, immediately in the deliberate false oath, and upon fulfilling the condition in the binding oath, due to his acceptance of disbelief, as clarified in “Al-Bahr.” It is established in the two Sahihs from him (ﷺ) that he said: “Whoever swears by a religion other than Islam, lying deliberately, is as he said.” It appears that this was stated in the context of the prevalent case, as the majority of those who swear such oaths are ignorant and believe that disbelief is necessary upon breaking it. If this is established, otherwise, the hadith is evidence for those who absolutely hold his disbelief.

² The statement: “Whoever kills himself with a piece of iron will be tormented with it in the fire of Hell”: The jurists and the people of the Sunnah unanimously agree that whoever kills himself does not exit Islam by that. Abu Hanifah and Muhammad said: He is washed and prayed over, and this is the fatwa, though his sin is greater than one who kills another. Kamal preferred the view of Abu Yusuf: “He is washed but not prayed over,” based on what is in “Muslim”: A man who killed himself was brought, and he (ﷺ) did not pray over him. In “Al-Bahr,” it is stated: The verification differs, but Abu Yusuf is supported by the hadith. I say: It may be said that the hadith does not indicate this, as it only states that he (ﷺ) did not pray over him. It appears he refrained as a deterrent to others from such an act, as he refrained from praying over a debtor, and it does not necessitate that no one among the companions prayed over him, as there is no equivalence between his prayer and that of others. Allah, the Exalted, said: Indeed, your prayer is a source of tranquility for them (At-Tawbah: 103). Know that this applies to one who kills himself intentionally. If it was by mistake, he is prayed over without disagreement, as clarified in “Al-Kifayah” and others, “Umdat al-Qari,” “Ad-Durr al-Mukhtar,” and “Radd al-Muhtar,” taken from them.

³ The statement: “Whoever says, ‘I am free from Islam,’ etc.”: Ibn al-Humam said: Saying, “He is free from Islam if he does such and such,” is an oath according to us, and likewise if he says he is free from prayer and fasting. [From “Al-Mirqat”] The statement: “There is no vow for the son of Adam in what he does not possess” will be addressed, God willing, in the chapter on vows.

² The statement: “Let him give charity”: The command to give charity is interpreted by the jurists as recommended, as evidenced by the fact that if one intends to give charity and does not, there is no obligation of charity or anything else, but a good deed is recorded for him. [From “Umdat al-Qari”]

¹ The statement: “And sees something better than it, let him do what is better”: The author of “Al-Hidayah” said: Whoever swears to commit a sin, such as not praying, not speaking to his father, or killing someone, should break it. Ibn al-Humam (may Allah be pleased with him) said: Meaning, it is obligatory for him to break his oath and expiate it. In “Radd al-Muhtar,” it is stated: It is not far-fetched that obligation is intended by their saying “it is preferable,” and it is expressed in “Al-Majma’” as “fulfilling righteousness is preferred.” This is supported by the statements in “Al-Hidayah,” “Al-Kanz,” and others: Whoever swears to commit a sin should break it, as breaking it is obligatory, as you have learned. They intended by “should” obligation, even though it is predominantly used for other than obligation, just as you say, “It is preferable for a Muslim to pray.”

² The statement: “Let him do what is better and expiate his oath”: Know that expiation has three states: First, before swearing, it does not suffice by consensus. Second, after swearing and breaking, it suffices by consensus. Third, after swearing but before breaking, there is disagreement regarding advancing expiation before breaking. Shafi’i, Malik, and Ahmad permitted it, except that Shafi’i said: If one expiates by fasting before breaking, it is not permissible, but freeing a slave, feeding, or clothing is permissible, just as advancing zakat before its time is permissible, but advancing the fast of Ramadan before its time is not. Abu Hanifah and his companions said: Expiation, with all its types, does not suffice before breaking, even if one expiates before breaking and then breaks, he must expiate again. Meaning, the time of obligation for expiation in a binding oath about the future is the time of breaking, so it is not obligatory except after breaking according to us. According to Shafi’i and others, its time is the time of the oath’s existence, so expiation is obligatory upon making the oath without breaking. The conclusion is that according to them, the oath is the cause of expiation, and breaking is a condition, so expiation is permissible after the cause is realized, as expiation is attributed to the oath. Allah, the Exalted, said: That is the expiation for your oaths when you have sworn (Al-Ma’idah: 89), which is an indication of causality, as obligations are attributed to their causes in reality, such as expiation for killing, expiation for declaration of prohibition, expiation for breaking the fast, and others. According to us, breaking is the cause of the obligation of expiation, and the oath is a condition, as the oath’s binding nature is based on intending fulfillment, doing what was sworn, and being truthful in swearing, which is commanded by Shariah, as Allah, the Exalted, said: And guard your oaths (Al-Ma’idah: 89). Thus, it is not a cause for expiation, as the least degree of a cause is that it leads to the ruling and is a path to it, but the oath prevents it, so how can it be a cause? The oath does not lead to expiation. What leads to it is breaking, if it occurs after the oath, so it is the cause, and the oath is a condition for obligation. Thus, advancing expiation before breaking is not permissible, as it is advancing before the cause. The attribution mentioned in the verse is to the condition, as attribution to the condition is permissible and established in Shariah, such as expiation for pilgrimage and charity of breaking the fast. Even if we grant that the oath is the cause, there is no doubt that breaking is a condition of obligation, as it is certain that expiation is not obligatory before it, otherwise it would be obligatory by the mere oath. The conditioned does not exist before its condition, so expiation does not occur as obligatory before it, nor does it remove the obligation before or at the time of its establishment by an act that was not obligatory before. As for the hadith, it is narrated with variations: “Let him do what is better and expiate his oath,” and “Then let him expiate his oath.” In all its narrations, it is evidence for us, not for them, because if expiation were obligatory by the oath itself, he would have said: “Whoever swears an oath, let him expiate,” without addressing what the oath was about. Breaking was required when it was better, followed by expiation. Since he specified the oath where breaking is better than fulfilling with breaking and expiation, it is specific to breaking, not the oath itself, even if it is by the oath’s establishment without breaking. These narrations with the letter “waw,” which is for absolute conjunction without precedence or delay, whether expiation is mentioned before or after, do not indicate advancing expiation before breaking as evidence for us. Likewise, what is narrated in some narrations: “Let him do what is better, then expiate his oath.” What is narrated in “Abu Dawud” and “Nasa’i” is: “If you swear an oath, expiate your oath, then do what is better.” If this hadith is authentic, its interpretation is that “then” means “and” to reconcile the different narrations. The evidence for the permissibility of “then” meaning “and” is Allah’s statement: Or a poor person in dust, then he is among those who believe (Al-Balad: 16-17), meaning “and he was before that,” as righteous deeds before faith are not considered. Thus, expiation is not obligatory before breaking. If it were as they say, expiation would be obligatory first, then breaking afterward, separated by the command for it. Saying that one is free to do it before or after negates the requirement of the command and the function of “then.” In Shafi’i’s view, expiation includes all its types. After breaking, the term applies to all, but before breaking, it is restricted to some, abandoning the apparent meaning for three reasons: First, calling it expiation when there is nothing to expiate, as expiation is for covering a sin like disbelief, and there is no sin before breaking. Second, diverting the command from obligation. It is answered that this is considering that breaking violates Allah’s sanctity outwardly or the swearer’s assumption that breaking entails sin. [Summarized from “Al-Luma’at”] Al-Barmawi said: “Sinful” is a comparative form implying participation, suggesting that giving expiation entails sin due to the lack of reverence for Allah’s name in breaking, and there is a customary connection between it and expiation. [From “Al-Mirqat”]

¹ The statement: “This is interpreted as applying to the one who demands it if he is wronged”: Its detail is in “Radd al-Muhtar.” In “Al-Khaniyah,” it is stated: If a man demands an oath from another, and he swears intending something other than what the one demanding intends, such as divorce, emancipation, or the like, the intention of the swearer is considered if the swearer does not intend contrary to the apparent, whether he is the wrongdoer or wronged. If the oath is by Allah, the Exalted, and the swearer is wronged, the intention is his, but if he is the wrongdoer intending to nullify another’s right, the intention of the one demanding is considered. This is the view of Abu Hanifah and Muhammad. I say: Restricting it to when he does not intend contrary to the apparent indicates that the consideration of the swearer’s intention is in judgment, as there is no disagreement about considering his intention in faith. This clarifies the difference between this and the view of Khassaf, who holds that his intention is considered in judgment as well, and the fatwa is according to his view if the swearer is wronged, as you have learned. In “Al-Hindiyyah” from “Al-Muhit,” the statement of Ibrahim an-Nakha’i is mentioned, and our companions adopted it, and its essence is in “Ad-Durr al-Mukhtar”: They said: The intention is for the swearer if by divorce or emancipation, and likewise by Allah if he is wronged. If he is the wrongdoer, it is for the one demanding. There is no relevance to judgment in the oath by Allah.

² The statement: “You were the most righteous and truthful of them”: Qadi Iyad narrated consensus that one who swears without being demanded and without a right attached to his oath has his intention considered, and his statement is accepted. If there is a right of another upon him, there is no disagreement that judgment is based on the apparent meaning of his oath, whether he swears voluntarily or by demand. [Summarized] If the consensus is established contrary to what the apparent hadith of Muslim suggests, it is relied upon. This can be supported by this hadith of Suwayd ibn Hanzalah mentioned in the chapter, as the Prophet (ﷺ) judged him as righteous in his oath, and he is not righteous except by considering his own intention, as he intended metaphorical brotherhood, while the one demanding intended literal brotherhood. Perhaps this is the basis of the consensus. [Summarized from “Nayl al-Awtar”]

¹ The statement: “This verse was revealed, etc.”: Know that oaths are of three types: unintentional, deliberate false, and binding. The unintentional is when one swears about a past act, believing it to be true, but it is actually contrary. This is the Hanafi view, narrated from Ibn Abbas and Ata ibn Abi Rabah regarding the interpretation of unintentional, and it is mentioned in the texts, “Al-Hidayah,” and its commentaries. It was held by Rabiah, Malik, Layth, Hasan, Mujahid, Nakha’i, Zuhri, Sulayman ibn Yasar, Qatadah, Sudi, and Mukhawwal. Two narrations are from Ahmad. In “Al-Fath,” it is stated that Ibn al-Mundhir and others narrated it from Ibn Umar, Ibn Abbas, and others among the companions. According to Shafi’i, it is what has no binding intent, slipping from the tongue or spoken ignorantly, such as the Arabs’ saying: “No, by Allah,” and “Yes, by Allah,” for mere emphasis, narrated from Aishah regarding the interpretation of unintentional, and held by Sha’bi, Tawus, and Ikrimah. Zayla’i narrated that it was narrated from Abu Hanifah like Shafi’i’s view. In “Al-Ikhtiyar,” it is stated that Muhammad narrated it from Abu Hanifah. In “Al-Bada’i,” it is narrated first from our companions, then it is stated: What Muhammad mentioned following his narration from Abu Hanifah that the unintentional is what people say: “No, by Allah,” and “Yes, by Allah,” is interpreted according to us as referring to the past or present, and according to us, that is unintentional. The essence of the disagreement between us and Shafi’i is regarding an oath not intended by the swearer for the future. According to us, it is not unintentional, and expiation is required. According to him, it is unintentional, and there is no expiation. His statement: “It is interpreted according to us, etc.” is a report of what Muhammad mentioned, based on that narration from Abu Hanifah, intending to clarify the difference between it and Shafi’i’s view, as the future is unintentional according to him, not us. Our evidence is Allah’s statement: Allah does not hold you accountable for the unintentional in your oaths, but He holds you accountable for the oaths you have bound yourselves with (Al-Ma’idah: 89), contrasting the unintentional oath with the binding oath, distinguishing between them by accountability and its negation. Thus, the unintentional oath must be other than the binding oath to realize the contrast. An oath about the future is a binding oath, whether intended or not, because unintentional in language is a name for something without reality, as Allah, the Exalted, said: They hear therein no idle talk (Maryam: 62), meaning falsehood. This applies to what we said, which is swearing by what has no reality, but on the swearer’s belief that it is as he swore, while the reality is contrary. Likewise, what slips from the tongue without intention, but about the past or present, has no reality, so it is unintentional and has no ruling, thus it is not a binding oath, as it has a ruling. Do you not see that accountability is established for it, and expiation is required by the text? This indicates that the unintentional is what we said. Thus, it is narrated from Ibn Abbas regarding the interpretation of the unintentional oath: It is when a man swears a false oath, believing it to be true. It is clarified that Aishah’s statement and the statement of the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ): The unintentional oath is what people say: “No, by Allah,” and “Yes, by Allah,” refers to the past, not the future. The evidence is that she interpreted it as the past, narrated from Matar from a man who said: I and Ibn Umar entered upon Aishah, and I asked her about the unintentional oath. She said: A man’s statement: “We did such and such, by Allah,” and “We made such and such, by Allah.” Thus, that narration is interpreted according to this to reconcile the two narrations, as the ambiguous is interpreted by the clear. The conclusion is that the unintentional according to us is of two types: The first is what is mentioned in the texts, and the second is what is in this narration, so this narration clarifies the type omitted by the authors of the texts. In “Al-Fath,” it is explicitly stated that there is no accountability for the unintentional in both interpretations. [Taken from “Radd al-Muhtar” and “Al-Bada’i”]

¹ The statement: “And a deliberate false oath, etc.”: Meaning the deliberate false oath, which is when one swears about a past act, deliberately lying, knowing it is contrary. The binding oath is when one swears about a future act, intending or not intending that statement. According to us, if he breaks a binding oath, expiation is obligatory, and he sins, otherwise not. There is nothing obligatory in the unintentional or deliberate false oath, but he sins in the deliberate false oath, and there is no expiation except repentance and seeking forgiveness, and forgiveness is hoped for in the unintentional. According to Shafi’i, as expiation is obligatory in the binding oath, it is obligatory in the deliberate false oath. Our view is supported by this hadith. The verification with evidence is sought from “At-Tafsir al-Ahmadiyyah” and books of jurisprudence. [Taken from “Al-Hidayah,” “Radd al-Muhtar,” and “At-Tafsir al-Ahmadiyyah”]

¹ The statement: "A man should not propose over his brother’s proposal, etc.": The prohibition according to the Hanafis is only after acceptance; otherwise, it is not, based on Fatimah bint Qays’ Hadith, where she mentioned that three proposed to her, and he did not object to some proposing over others. According to others, the prohibition is absolute. This is the summary of what Al-Tahawi said in "Sharh Ma‘ani al-Athar."

² The statement: “They recited, etc.”: Meaning if he cannot afford any of the three things, he fasts for three consecutive days. Shafi’i said: He may choose to separate them or make them consecutive, due to the generality of the text. According to us, there is the recitation of Ibn Mas’ud (may Allah be pleased with him): Fasting for three consecutive days, which is like a well-known report, and it is permissible to add to the general text of the Book with it. This hadith also supports it. [Taken from “Al-Hidayah” and “Al-Binayah”]

¹ The statement: "Shighar is when a man, etc.": In "An-Nahr": It is when a man engages in shighar, meaning he marries his woman on the condition that the other marries his woman to him, with no dowry except this. As in "Al-Mughrib," meaning that each woman’s intimacy is the dowry for the other. This condition is necessary for it to be called shighar. If he does not say this or its meaning, but says: "I marry you my daughter on the condition you marry me your daughter," and it is accepted, or "on the condition that my daughter’s intimacy is the dowry for your daughter," and the other does not accept but marries his daughter without making it a dowry, it is not shighar but a valid marriage by consensus. The dowry of peers is required in all cases because something unsuitable was named as dowry. In summary: Merely omitting the dowry does not necessitate invalidity according to them, as marriage is valid without naming a dowry. The reason for invalidity is making intimacy a dowry. Shighar is prohibited due to the absence of a dowry, so we require the dowry of peers, and it is no longer shighar.

¹ The statement: And let them fulfill their vows: This command indicates obligation. Although this was revealed concerning a specific vow, it may be used as evidence that fulfilling a vow absolutely is obligatory, because it is a command to fulfill the vow, and the text, according to us, is not restricted to its context or cause. Thus, it indicates that fulfilling every vow is obligatory. They used the term “obligation” here in contrast to a mandated duty, because it is a general rule from which some specific cases are excluded, such as a vow to commit a sin or a non-intended act of worship, making it presumptive. Therefore, they applied the term “obligation” to it, indicating the ambiguity.

³ The statement: “Whoever swears an oath, etc.”: Meaning whoever connects “If Allah wills” with his oath, it is nullified. This excludes when he says “If Allah wills” after his oath, disconnected, as it does not nullify his oath, because the exception only applies when connected, not disconnected. [Taken from the commentary on “Al-Wiqayah” and “Umdat ar-Ri’ayah”] If you say: The hadith in its generality does not distinguish between connected and disconnected. I say: The evidence from texts and others regarding the obligation of contracts necessitates connection, as permitting a disconnected exception would lead to nullifying all contracts, such as sales, marriages, and others, and the corruption in that is evident, as stated by Ayni. Sadr ash-Shari’ah mentioned in the evidence for prohibiting delay: The hadith “Let him expiate his oath” obligated expiation, so if a delayed exception were permissible, expiation would not be obligatory in any oath, as he could say delayed: “If Allah wills,” nullifying his oath. [From “At-Ta’liq al-Mumajjad”] This is also supported by the report of Bayhaqi and Darqutni mentioned in the book. In “Umdat al-Qari,” it is stated: The exception here refers to the phrase “If Allah wills,” not the technical exception, such as: “By Allah, I will do such and such, if Allah wills,” or he said: “By Allah, I will do such and such,” then “If Allah wills.” There is disagreement among the scholars. Ibrahim, Hasan, Thawri, Abu Hanifah, his companions, Awza’i, Layth, and the majority of scholars said: Its condition is that it is connected to the oath. Shafi’i said: The exception must be connected to the initial speech, meaning without separation, in a coherent manner. If there is a pause, it is disconnected, unless it is for recollection, breathing, or inability to speak, explaining his intent, or a break in voice. They also disagreed about the exception in divorce and emancipation. Ibn Abi Layla, Awza’i, Layth, and Malik said: The exception is not permissible, and it is narrated from Ibn Abbas and Ibn al-Musayyib. Tawus, Nakha’i, Hasan, Ata in a narration, Abu Hanifah, his companions, Shafi’i, his companions, and Ishaq said: The exception is permissible. In “Al-Bahr,” it is stated: The apparent statement of the author of “Al-Kanz”: If he connects “If Allah wills” with his oath, he is free, meaning the oath is binding but there is no breaking upon him due to the inability to know Allah’s will, the Exalted. This is the view of Abu Yusuf (may Allah be pleased with him). According to Abu Hanifah and Muhammad (may Allah be pleased with them), attaching to the will nullifies it. Thus, it is stated in “At-Tabyin”: He meant by “free” the lack of binding, as it entails no breaking, like being free, so he used it absolutely. The essence of the jurists’ statements is that everything attached to speech, the connected will nullifies it, whether worship or transaction, unlike what is attached to the heart, like intention.